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Abstract
This report analyzes the timber-auction system introduced in Russia in 1997, focusing
on the Murmansk region. The Russian auction system is strongly inspired by the North-
American practice but many preconditions for the system to function efficiently are
absent. The main obstacles are the shortage of auction participants and the resulting
possibility of collusion. Thus, “one bidder-auctions” are common. This drives the
Federal Forest Service (FFS) to lease timber at a low reservation price. By doing this,
the FFS ensures social efficiency in the sense that a socially beneficial trade is carried
out. However, this achievement is made at the cost of a modest rent appropriation. In
Murmansk, we probably witness a true disinterest in timber resources, which is caused
by unpredictable economic and political conditions. Short-term contracts dominate
forestry activities and there are few incentives for developing sustainable forest use.
Auction theory asserts that collusion is more likely in oral auctions than in sealed-bid
auctions. Collusion is also more easily sustained in second price than in first price
sealed-bid auctions. Since the latter auction form is most common, the FFS does seem
to apply the formal means of control that they possess. This has made the market more
transparent. However, with only a few market participants auctions may easily
“collapse” into informal bilateral bargaining between the seller and the most likely
buyer.
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1Auctions Without Competition:
The Case of Timber Sales in
the Murmansk Region
Birgit Jacobsen (birgit.jacobsen@nibr.no)
1. Introduction*
Most empirical studies of timber auctions have been carried out in highly developed and
well-functioning market economies such as the United States and Canada. The
development of auction systems has been accompanied by a large body of theoretical
research (cf. McAfee and McMillan, 1987, for a survey). The auctions introduced in
Russia in 1997 were strongly inspired by the North-American experience. Needless to
say, the timber auction system in Russia is immature and operates under highly
imperfect market conditions. The present analysis deals with the Murmansk region
(from now on: Murmansk) in northwest Russia. The aim of this work is first and
foremost to classify the formal system of timber auctions introduced in Russia by
comparing it with Western auction models. The legal acts and regulations that
accompany the introduction of new institutional arrangements are fairly complicated,
and we will try to bring some clarity into the new concepts formulated in these
documents. The purpose is to explain, on the basis of auction theories, the conditions
that have to be fulfilled for the auction system to function efficiently, and to discuss the
problems facing the Russian authorities at this stage of implementation.
Forests are state property in Russia and will probably remain so in the foreseeable
future. Auctions are not aimed at transferring state forests into private property. Their
purpose is to allocate scarce timber resources as efficiently as possible through leasing
contracts, in ways that ascertain transparency, impartiality and predictability in
accordance with the law (Forest Code, 1997; The World Bank, 1996). The Federal
Forest Service (FFS) is the chief administrator of the forest fund and plays the role of a
monopolist in forest maintenance. The FFS is facing huge challenges. The forest sector
in Murmansk has, as northwest Russia in general, experienced a structural and
economic crisis in the 1990s with plummeting timber production (Ivanova and Nygaard,
1999; Jacobsen 1999a; Malkova and Ivanova, 1999). In 1995, Murmansk sawmill
production was 87 percent lower than in 1990. Removal of roundwood timber was
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 The empirical part of this paper is based on document studies (federal legislation and regulations),
secondary literature and field work interviews made in Murmansk during September 1998 and March
1999. An earlier version (Jacobsen, 1999b) of this report was presented at the General Conference of
EADI (European Association of Development Research and Training Institutes) 22–25 September 1999.
2reduced by 88 percent. The forest sector in Murmansk is now characterized by its
depletion of industrial forests, its outmoded technological equipment, lack of credits to
allow around the year harvesting and production, long distances to harvesting plots, lack
of infrastructure for transporting timber, and high transportation (railway) costs (Selin,
1998).
The transition of the economic policy, state institutions, and society in Russia has been
accompanied by the adoption of huge amounts of legislative acts and regulations. This
also concerns the forest sector.1 Russian authorities have made efforts to streamline
much of their policy according to Western standards. But the Russian context, into
which these new policies have been adopted, differs from Western society in many
respects. Russia is not only a country in transition, but it is also a former superpower in
deep crisis. The current Russian society is a jelly-like organism absorbing policies, legal
acts and decisions in its own way.
In the Soviet era, forest enterprises were part of a centralized production and
distribution system. They were ensured regular access to timber resources. As the
command economy gave way to a market economy, these networks were destroyed.
During the decades of Soviet rule, the forest sector underwent several organizational
changes (Malmlöv, 1998; Nilsson et al., 1992; Malkova and Peshev, 1997). After the
demise of the Soviet Union, the Russian State Forest Industry Company (Roslesprom)
was established in 1993 on the basis of the former Ministry of Forest Industry
(Minlesprom). Until 1996, the TPO Murmanles was part of Roslesprom and exercised
the monopolist’s right to extract timber resources in Murmansk. This state of affairs
ended in 1996 when TPO Murmanles closed down. Similarly, in 1993, the Soviet State
Forest Committee (Goskomles) was transformed into the Russian Federal Forest Service
(Rosleskhoz). Its task is to carry out forest protection, secure reproduction, and provide
management and control of the forests (Regulations... No. 544, 1998; and Regulations...
No. 173, 1998).
According to official Russian policy, the privatization of logging enterprises were to
take place in 1993 (The World Bank, 1996:46). In Murmansk, privatization in the forest
sector was first enforced in 1996, when it happened almost overnight. It was met with
local resistance and it brought no dramatic change of leadership in the forest enterprises.
Afterwards many of them went bankrupt. This was the scenery behind the introduction
of timber auctions in Murmansk in 1997.
This report is structured as follows. The next section describes the main auction types as
outlined in the theoretical literature. Section 3 describes the auction forms that have
been introduced in Russia. Section 4 discusses different aspects of the auction system. It
evaluates the degree to which auctions are likely to foster true competition in northwest
Russia and how the absence of competition may be alleviated by the imposition of a
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 See, for example, Forest Code (1997); Regulations... No. 99 (1997); Regulations... No. 123 (1997);
Regulations... No. 173 (1998); Regulations... No. 345 (1998); Regulations... No. 544 (1998);
Regulations... No. 551 (1998); and Pappila, 1999. In 1992, Russian authorities committed themselves to
follow up the UN Conference on Environment and Development in Rio de Janeiro. Within this
framework Russian authorities worked out the Federal strategic program “Forests of Russia” 1997–
2000. This program is considered a formal tool to ensure ecological, economic and social sustainability in
the forest sector. Regional programs followed the federal program — in the Murmansk region the
Regional strategic program “Forests of Murmansk region” 1997–2000 was developed.
3reservation price — but sometimes at the cost of spoiling a socially beneficial trade. We
discuss the existence of collusion and bargaining activities that may arise when there are
only a few — or only one — potential buyer(s). We look upon the extent to which
sustainable utilization may be supported by long-term contracts. Section 5 presents the
conclusions. The bottom line is that a sophisticated auction system was introduced in
Murmansk into an environment in which there is a serious shortage of auction
participants. As a matter of definition, an auction requires at least some form of
competition among potential buyers. In Murmansk this is seldom the case. Auctions
without competitive bidding is the rule, rather than the exception.
2. Models of Auction and Bidding Systems
An auction is “a market institution with an explicit set of rules determining resource
allocation and prices on the basis of bids from the market participants” (McAfee and
McMillan, 1987:701). Auctions enable the sales of products without a fixed price or a
standard value. The price depends upon the demand and supply at a certain point in time,
possibly influenced by anticipated future developments in the market. The typical
purpose of an auction is for the seller to obtain a price, which lies as close as possible to
the highest valuation among potential buyers. If the seller knew the valuations, there
would have been no need to arrange an auction. The seller could then offer the ‘goods’
to the potential buyer with the highest valuation at a price equal to (or slightly below)
that valuation. But valuations are generally unknown and auctions are essentially
revelation mechanisms. We will describe four main auction types (McAfee and
McMillan, 1987):
 the English auction (oral, open, with ascending bids);
 the Dutch auction (oral, open, with descending bids);
 the first-price sealed-bid auction; and
 the second-price sealed-bid auction (the Vickrey auction).2
The English auction is the most common auction form. At any point in time each bidder
knows the level of the current highest bid. Bidders are able to observe their rival’s bids
and revise their own. Oral bidding begins at the highest of the sealed bids. The
auctioneer can set a minimum acceptable increment to the highest existing bid. In a
Dutch auction, the auctioneer calls an initial high price and then lowers the price until a
bidder accepts. Under a first-price sealed-bid auction potential buyers submit sealed
bids. Each bidder can only submit one bid and the highest bidder is awarded the item.
For sealed-bid timber auctions, there is no pre-auction qualification round of bidding.
The FFS collects the sealed bids until the submission deadline and awards the plot to the
bidder who submitted the highest bid for a price equal to his bid (Baldwin et al.,
1997:691).3 With a second-price sealed-bid auction, bidders submit sealed bids having
been informed that the highest bidder wins the item, but pays a price equal not to his
own bid but to the second-highest bid.
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 After William Vickrey who wrote the seminal paper on auctions in 1961.
3
 Plot in Russian: lesosek, delianka.
4A well-known but still quite remarkable result of auction theory is that all these forms
of auctions on average yield the same revenue to the seller. A unique Pareto efficient
Nash-equilibrium exists in each auction in which the bidder with the highest valuation
obtains the ‘goods’, but pays a price equal to the next highest valuation of the bidders.
In an English auction, which is oral and open to all participants at the same time, the
result is intuitively simple. For each participant there is a dominant strategy to remain in
the bidding until the price reaches the bidder’s own valuation. The winning bidder does
not need to reveal his true valuation because he will make a bid just slightly above the
second highest valuation. In a second-price sealed-bid auction, there is also a dominant
strategy. Each participant submits a bid equal to his true valuation. Again, the intuition
is simple. Assume that a bidder was considering a bid below his true valuation. The
only case in which this would change the outcome is if that bid were also below the
second highest bid, in which case he would lose the item. Assume then that a bidder was
considering a bid above his true valuation. This would only change the outcome if even
the second highest bid were above his valuation, in which case he would win the item at
a price above his valuation. Hence, to the extent that a deviation from the true valuation
changes the outcome at all, it worsens the outcome for the potential buyer. The intuition
is not as simple in the case of the Dutch auction and the first price seal-bid auction. In
these cases, there are no dominant strategies; each actor’s best response is dependent
upon the other actors’ strategies. Therefore, each actor must form expectations about the
others’ actions. On average it results, however, that the next highest evaluation will
become the sales price, even in these cases.
2.1 The Reservation Price
How is the value distributed among the seller and the buyer in an auction?
                                                                 r1                     r2
  v0                  v1                       v2
                                                      The reservation price options
Figure 1:  Distribution of value between seller and buyer in an auction.
Consider the simple case, related to Russian forestry, with only two bidders. In Figure 1,
v0 indicates the revenue (valuation) of the FFS, the seller, if it does not sell the leasing
rights (the ‘goods’). v1 indicates the valuation of one bidder, and v2 the valuation of
another bidder. As we have seen, all the standard types of auctions yield the same result.
Participant 2, who has the highest valuation, obtains the item. The total revenue
associated with the transaction of (v2-v0) is distributed in such a way that the FFS
obtains (v1-v0), while the buyer (participant 2) obtains (v2-v1). Now, if the FFS knew
the valuations of the potential buyers it could obviously do much better than this. It
could simply set the price equal to v2 (or slightly below), offer the lease to participant 2,
and thereby capture the whole rent.
5In reality, however, the FFS does not know the true valuations of the potential buyers (in
which case, the auction would be superfluous). But, realizing that a pure auction could
yield an unreasonably high rent to the buyer, the FFS may set a reservation price which
it believes lies close to, but not above, the highest valuation (such as r1 in the figure).
But since the valuations are unknown, it also runs the risk of overestimating the highest
valuation and setting the reservation price too high (such as r2). In which case, an
efficiency loss is imposed, from a social point of view, as the reservation price prevents
gains from trade being realized.
2.2 The Number of Bidders
Increasing the number of bidders increases the seller’s revenue on average, as the
expected difference between the participants highest and the next highest valuation will
decrease (ceteris paribus). Thus, the larger the number of bidders, the weaker the case is
for a reservation price. At the other extreme: if there is only one bidder, he will bid the
lowest possible bid, i.e., the valuation of the seller or the reservation price. According to
economic literature it is not exceptional to have few bidders participating in auctions
(McAfee and McMillan, 1987:703). However, if there is only one bidder the system
does not result in an auction, but rather bilateral bargaining. A reasonable prediction in
this case is the generalized Nash bargaining solution in which the two parties split the
total surplus according to their relative bargaining power. In the Russian context this
opens the ground for corruptive behavior.
A monopolist often directs auctions. Auction theory presumes that the monopolist has
bargaining power because of his ability to commit himself in advance to a set of policies
— and thus set some important conditions for trade. At the same time, the potential
buyers know that the organizer of the auction has an interest in following the procedures
of the auction. If the FFS should deflect from procedures already set when observing the
bids, the bidders would act differently in future transactions and the FFS would lose
credibility and thus bargaining power. The outcome of an auction depends on the
institutional setting and the parties’ ability to commit themselves credibly to certain
actions with, e.g., “take-it-or-leave-it” offers.
2.3 Collusion
Collusion refers to a situation where the final price — or the winning bid — results
from collaboration among two or more potential buyers. This collaboration contributes
to lowering the final price. Stigler (1964) has noted that collusion is more likely to occur
in oral auctions than in sealed-bid auctions because it is less costly for the actors who
are colluding to detect if the other actor is cheating in oral auctions. All bidders’
identities and bids are immediately known for all participants. Sealed-bid auctions
prevent potential participants from colluding. Robinson (1985) made the simple but
important point that a collusive agreement may be easier to sustain in a second-price
than a first-price auction. Assuming that there are no problems among all of the bidders
in coming to an agreement or in sharing the rewards between them and abstracting from
any concerns about detection, the optimal agreement in a second-price auction is for the
designated winner to bid infinitely high while all the others bid zero. No other bidder
has any incentive to cheat on this agreement. In a first price auction the bidders must
6agree that the designated winner bid an arbitrarily small amount, while all the others bid
zero. It turns out that all the others have a substantial incentive to cheat on the
agreement (Klemperer, 1999).
With a large number of potential bidders we assume that collusion is complicated
because it is impossible to control all potential bidders. With few bidders the potential
for collusion increases. With only one potential buyer, price setting is determined
through some form of bilateral negotiation.
The potential for collusive bidding at government timber sales has long been recognized
in the United States. Baldwin et al. (1997) conclude that bidder collusion best explains
winning bids, but the data they use came from a region where the mill density is very
high. Brannman (1996) found that potential competition significantly affects the size of
winning bids in FFS sealed-bid auctions and has little effect on winning bids in oral
auctions.4 This result is inconsistent with competitive bidding but highly consistent with
collusive behavior.
3. Auctions and Tenders in Russia
Timber auctions connect different processes of the production chain in the forest sector.
They relate forest management with production, as logging companies and saw mills
buy licenses or cutting permits to extract resources from the forests to meet their own
production goals. Prior to a timber auction, information about the forest plots should be
available to all potential bidders. Inventories of the forest stands in every region should
be provided regularly and delivered to the FFS in Moscow.5 Russian authorities have
introduced two types of timber auctions and timber tenders with a longer duration: 6
1. Competitive oral timber auctions;
2. Combined oral and sealed-bid timber auctions; and
3. Timber tenders.
Depending upon their importance, auctions are carried out by means of (1) oral auction
(ustnye sorevnovaniya, torgi) or (2) as a combination of oral and written claims
(pismennyie zaiavleniia) (sealed-bid timber auctions). Through these two kinds of timber
auctions leasing rights in Murmansk are sold for a relatively small area for a period of
one year. The criterion for determining who is to become the winner is solely that of the
highest bid.
Through (3) timber tenders (konkursy) leasing rights are offered for rather large areas
(from a few thousand to ten thousand ha). The leaseholder is only allowed to use the
timber resources specified in the contract (for harvesting, hunting, tourism, etc.). In
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 In his 1996 article, Brannman examined the impact of potential competition on winning bids in Forest
Service oral and sealed-bid timber auctions held during 1977 in the Pacific Northwest.
5
 In the Murmansk region inventories have been carried out for 3,723.3 ha of the forest fund during the
past 10 years, 2,208.9 ha the last 11–15 years, and 2,256.0 ha the last 16–20 years (The Regional
Strategic Program, 1998).
6
 Cf. Regulations ... No. 99 (1997) and Regulations ... No. 123 (1997).
7timber tenders only written bids are considered. The suggested price is only one of
several criteria that determine who wins. Other criteria are the duration of contract,
experience, competence, technology, and establishing jobs for the local population. The
auction commission may investigate the pretenders. The leasing rights may last up to 49
years. There are two forms of tenders, open (otkrytye) and closed (zakrytye). Closed
tenders are held for a restricted circle of persons selected by the commission of the forest
tender. The commission decides on the form of tender.
Every region decides on which level (regional or local) timber auctions and tenders are
to be carried out. In Murmansk the timber auctions are locally organized, timber tenders
are conducted regionally. 7 The combined model of oral auctions and written bids is the
most commonly used method. In other regions, leasing of timber plots larger than 1,000
m
3
 are carried out on the regional level, while the leasing of smaller plots are locally
conducted.
Competitive oral forest auctions are similar to English auctions with a small overture:
prior to an oral auction interested bidders are required to submit sealed bids. During the
auction these bids are opened. Bidders who submit sealed bids not less than a minimum
price (the stumpage price) qualify for the oral bidding stage of the auction. Oral bidding
begins at the highest of the sealed bids.
Combined auctions are quite similar to first-price sealed-bid auctions. They start as oral
auctions, but end with sealed bids.8 Each bidder can only submit one bid and the highest
bidder is awarded the item for a price equal to his bid.
Timber tenders classify as first-price sealed-bid auctions, but differ with regard to the
more subjective criteria concerning the pretenders’ experience, competence, technology
and potential as a creator of local jobs.
The winner of the auction and the organizer sign a protocol, which has the form of a
contract. This contract describes the location and limitation of the plots, the amount and
type of forest use, and payment. Finally, the forest management unit of the FFS (leskhoz)
produces a list presenting the results of the auction. Closed auctions are announced,
when bigger quantities of timber stocks are sold. Potential bidders are invited to
participate in the auctions (Regulations ... No. 99, 1997).9
The organizer of an auction sets the initial participation fee, which should be paid in
advance by potential bidders to confirm their interest in participating in the auction. The
size of the fee is decided by the organizer and should not be less than 10 percent of the
FFS’s reservation price. This fee is subtracted from the total price if a purchase takes
place. The fee is returned to those who did not purchase any timber. If the winner of the
auction does not pay the realized price within 20 days after signing the contract, the
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 According to information provided in July 1999 by Pavel Pestov of the Murmansk Forest Management.
8
 If there are equal bids for a forest plot, the dispute will be solved through a final oral competition among
the relevant bidders.
9
 In the U.S. and Canada it is more common for mills to bid at private timber sales than at auctions
directed by the Forest Service. The information is not publicly announced and participants are invited.
8trade is canceled (and the winner will not receive his deposit) (Regulations... No 99,
1997, art. 48–49, and; Regulations... No 551, 1998, art. 50).
Lease contracts are valid for a period of one to five years (Forest Code, 1997:art. 34).
Contracts concluded on the basis of tenders (for a period up to 49 years) must be
followed by a forest management plan (proekt vedeniia lesnogo khoziaistva na
arendovannom uchastke). Concessions, however, relate to plots that are undeveloped
and require basic infrastructure investments (ibid.:art. 37). They are only given to
foreign companies for the utilization and processing of timber resources, and the
Russian Government takes this decision without the participation of local forest
management units. There is still confusion in Murmansk about the difference between
leasing and concessions. Cutting permits (lesorubochnye bilety) are issued for short-
term use of forests (up to one year). The local forest management unit (the leskhoz)
issues cutting permits, granting a forest user the right to procure and remove timber,
resin and secondary forest resources (ibid.:art. 42). Payment is not demanded for
intermediate cutting carried out in the leaseholder’s area (Regulations ... No. 345, 1998,
art. 29). This measure is probably directed at stimulating harvesting enterprises to make
cuttings that promote sustainability.
4. The Degree of Competition in the Murmansk Forest Sector
4.1 The “Action Arena”
We consider the timber auction or timber tender as an “action arena” (Ostrom et al.,
1994), where the “actors” are the seller — in our case it is the FFS in Murmansk — and
the potential buyers or “bidders” who make their bids to lease timber plots from the
Federal Forest Fund. The FFS leases timber resources to users (timber harvesting
enterprises, ministries and agencies, judicial persons) and the lease agreements are
concluded on the basis of tenders or auctions (Forest Code, 1997:art. 41). The FFS
formulates procedures for sharing forest resources, payment of taxes, etc., and
obligations relating to the investment of infrastructure facilities. Timber constitutes the
“goods” which is the object of evaluation and trade during an auction. A timber auction
can provide the means for the FFS to achieve a socially efficient utilization of forest
resources. An important aim of the FFS is to lease timber to bidders who can make the
best use of the resources while adhering to sustainability norms. The main goal of the
bidders is to make a profit on forest use. Since real-life actors do not possess perfect
information, they will have to estimate the value of timber resources offered through
tender or auction. They use the information given in the public announcement and
assessment along with their own calculations.
As shown in the theoretical discussion, the type of auction does not influence the
expected price. On average, they all yield the same revenue to the seller if the bidders
behave independently. However, the auction form does play a role if a risk of collusion
exists among the potential bidders. Collusion activities are more easily performed
during oral than in sealed-bid auctions. Collusion is also more easily sustained in
second price than first price sealed-bid auctions (cf. section 2.3). Thus, the FFS can best
exercise control if it conducts a first price sealed-bid auction. An oral auction ending as
a first price sealed-bid auction will have this form of control.
9Let us have a closer look at the extent to which the auction system is able to fulfill the
following four aims, namely:
1. to obtain social efficiency in the sense that leasing rights are allocated to the
potential buyer with the highest valuation;
2. to extract pure rents embedded in the timber resources;
3. to facilitate a sustainable use of the forest plots; and
4. to bring transparency into the transaction process.
Here we will try to assess the extent to which the forest sector has developed a
competitive climate that is conducive to the enforcement of these goals through the
auction system currently in use. In section 2.1, we concluded that auctions normally do
deliver social efficiency. There are at least three cases in which this result may be
violated: if a reservation price is applied; if there are restrictions on efficient use, such
as prohibiting sub-leasing; or if some prospective buyers (with potentially high
valuations) are excluded from participating. In the following subsections, it will be clear
that all these violations are relevant in the Murmansk forest sector. Furthermore, the
possibility for the FFS to extract rents depends crucially on two factors: the distribution
of the buyers’ valuations and the number of potential bidders. A characteristic feature of
timber auctions in Murmansk is that the spread in the participants’ valuations is large
and that the number of potential buyers is low.
4.2 The Trade-off Between Realizing a High Price and the
Risk of Spoiling Trade
As shown in the theoretical discussion in section 2, auctions with few bidders, who also
have very different valuations, do not deliver on the goal of rent extraction. By
enforcing a reservation price, the government faces a trade-off between the goals of
maximum rent extraction on the one hand and social efficiency on the other. A low
reservation price ensures social efficiency, in the sense that a larger socially beneficial
trade is carried out, and the rights are allocated to the potential buyer with the highest
valuation. But this achievement is made at the cost of a lower rent appropriation. A high
reservation price, on the other hand, might yield a better price, but risks spoiling trade
altogether.
In practice, the FFS in Moscow first sets the minimum price (mimima’lnaia stavka).
The FFS on the regional level then adjusts the price (konkretnaia stavka), which cannot
be lower than the price set in Moscow. Altogether, this constitutes the stumpage price
(popennaia plata or stoimost’ drevesiny na korniu). The stumpage price is determined
by the FFS and supposed to be calculated as follows: Stumpage price = World market
prices minus transportation costs minus harvesting costs minus other costs linked to
harvesting (including taxes and fines unrelated to profits) minus risk and profit
compensation to investors.10 The local forest management unit (the leskhoz) decides the
final reservation price, based on local knowledge about quality and composition of
timber stock, and based on distances of hauling and distance to foreign markets.
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 The stumpage price is differentiated according to wood tariff regions, wood tariff belts, groups of wood
species, reserves of wood, and transportation distance.
10
According to Regulations ...  No. 345 (1998, art. 27), the estimated yearly output from
the forest plot(s) should be calculated at this price. It should consider the low expected
production capacity of forest enterprises during the first 1–3 years and the investments
that have to be made to establish and develop the production capacity. In Murmansk,
there is a significant difference between the reservation price in the northern and the
southern areas caused by great differences in quality and accessibility of timber.
Until the Federal Forest Code was enacted in 1997, the “stumpage price” was a charge
paid at stump for the harvest of timber. These charges were administratively fixed.11
Today, the stumpage price is the basis for the reservation price and not a general charge.
Timber may not be leased below the reservation price.12 Logging enterprises typically
pay a price not exceeding 2–3 percent of the total production value. During the six first
months of 1999, twelve timber auctions were carried out in Murmansk, offering 37
different forest plots for lease.
Since there were no competitive biddings that could increase the price, all these plots
were eventually leased at the reservation price. There were only single potential buyers
participating at all the auctions. In continuing to lease forest plots at a low price the FFS
at least achieves an improved social efficiency in the sense that a socially beneficial
trade is actually carried out, but at the cost of a small (or non-existent) rent extraction. If
the FFS wanted to increase the stumpage price, it could hire an international company
as a “third party” to make an objective certification and valuation of the forests in
Murmansk. This would be reasonable under circumstances where the FFS believe that
stumpage is set too low and where the expected profit by doing this certification would
exceed presumed costs.
4.3 Participants’ Valuations
Differences in valuations may arise because of the differences in firm specific operating
costs and market access or differences in information. When logging enterprises and
sawmills are secured an uninterrupted flow of logs for the production process, the
leaseholder is allowed to be more flexible as to when timber is cut (Baldwin et al.,
1997). This seems to have a positive effect on prices and winning bids are generally
higher.
Costs typically vary substantially depending upon the geographical location of mills and
the associated hauling distance, as well as on the capital equipment installed in each
mill. Such differences could be reduced (or even eliminated) if sub-leasing were
allowed. However, according to the Forest Code (1997:art. 34) and Regulations ... No.
345 (1998, art. 5), sub-leasing is prohibited. Thus, winners of timber auctions are not
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 In 1996, the average stumpage price in Russia was less than 1 US dollar per cubic meter, compared to
up to 30 US dollars in Scandinavia and about 10 US dollars in other countries (The World Bank, 1996).
12
 The average stumpage price of 1 m3 timber at forest plots in the Murmansk region was about 18 rubles
as of mid-1998. The reservation price, which seemed to become the price paid at auctions, varied between
25–45 rubles for 1 m3, depending upon location, stock, distance of timber hauling, the presence of
transport routes, and demand for forest resources.
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allowed to resell leasing rights from their leased plots to neighboring mills.13 This
contributes not only to a larger spread in potential buyers’ valuations but also to an
inefficient use of forest resources. Many enterprises are not able to make use of all the
timber because of species variation and forest quality heterogeneity. They lack
specialization and apply outmoded technologies. Thus, the value of timber plots is
reduced since buyers may not resell leasing rights to others who utilize the timber in a
more efficient way.
In order to ascertain that all market participants have access to the same information,
relatively clear formal procedures exist for conducting auctions in the Murmansk
region. As in the United States, auctions must be announced (in the regional or local
newspapers) 30 days before they take place (Regulations ... No. 99, 1997). The
announcement should include the date and place of the auction, a short description of
the characteristics of the plots, their location and the estimated volume of allowed
cutting, the stumpage price, and the sum of advance payment required for participation
in the auction. The organizers of the timber auction are obliged to provide full and
accurate information about the auction units to the potential buyer.
According to Regulations ... No. 99 (1997, chapter VII, pp. 51–56), the local forest
management units (leskhozy) that actually conduct timber auctions have several
obligations when evaluating the forest stands. They should delimit forest plots, ensure
accurate determination of quantity and quality of timber within the boundaries of
applied taxation methods, and grant necessary and reliable information about the
auction units to be sold. Hence “inside information” and local knowledge about the area
can influence the potential buyers’ valuations and willingness to claim their bids.
Information is typically asymmetric. The local industry has more direct links to the
regional administration and thus can be better informed than foreign companies about
the arrangement of auctions and the conditions in the forests. It appears that regional
authorities are inherently skeptical towards foreign investors, an attitude that is perhaps
justified from experience. However, this contributes to narrowing the range of auction
participants. The low salaries could make foreign industrial investments and activities in
some areas of the Murmansk forests quite profitable.
4.4 The Number of Bidders
Auction theory predicts that an increase in the number of bidders on average increases
the seller’s revenue. The larger the number of bidders, the smaller will be the expected
difference between the participants’ highest and next highest valuation. The number of
firms closely located to the timber resources plays a significant role with regard to the
number of potential bidders (Brannman, 1996). But when an auction involves the
construction of permanent roads, only large firms may have the required financial
strength to participate. Only these firms possess the needed working capital and
specialized road building equipment. In Murmansk, one has tried to attract more
investors by announcing the auctions in both regional and local newspapers. However,
the regional authorities have concluded that announcing auctions on the regional level
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 In the U.S. and Canada highly specialized harvesting companies and sawmills seldom make use of all
the timber they have leased. They are allowed to resell considerable amounts of timber from the leased
plots to neighboring mills, increasing the efficiency of forest use.
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has minimal effect on the number of bidders — potential buyers are first and foremost
interested in timber resources close to their own mills.
According to the Regulations on leasing of plots from the Forest Fund (Regulations ...
No. 345, 1998, art. 8), forest plots can be leased without competition for a period of 1–5
years to forest users (including also agricultural organizations) who have been
extracting the resource in the area for a longer period. These users ought to have the
production capabilities of carrying out the harvesting and processing of timber.
Competition could also be strengthened through the participation of foreign firms.
Formally, both Russian and foreign actors are allowed to participate in open competitive
biddings. But the great economic and political uncertainties in Russia along with
unclear and contradicting legislation are some reasons for the low number of foreign
participants. Russia lacks trust abroad and foreign investors are cautious about making
investments. Many have met restrictions set by regional authorities, which seem to favor
local industry at the expense of foreigners.
On the territory of Murmansk Oblast, 26 forest plots were leased (as of March 1999) but
only seven of these were for timber production. The others were leased for reindeer
pasture, cattle breeding, and haymaking.14 The long hauling distances and the under-
developed infrastructure make forest plots in Murmansk less attractive to potential
buyers. Forest enterprises rarely have the required working capital and specialized road
building equipment. The density of the transport net in Murmansk is 0.08 kilometers per
100 ha of forestland and more than 60 percent of the roads are in a bad condition. This
makes it difficult to carry out harvesting and afforestation. Actually, the building of
forest roads has stopped in Murmansk (The Regional Strategic Program, 1998). In
January 1998, forest lands in the Murmansk region amounted to 67.5 percent of the total
area. Two thirds of the forest land contained exploitable forests. However, only 14.1
percent (9780.400 ha) of this potential was actually exploited. This was down from an
exploitation rate of 25 percent two years earlier and as much as 50 percent in 1980. The
development indicates a huge under-utilization of current timber resources in
Murmansk. Hence, timber auctions channel only a small part of the resources that are
available.
However, the commercial interest for the extraction of forest resources clearly varies
with the geographic location of enterprises. The forests in the southern part of the region
are more densely forested and productive than in the northern part. In the south, the
distance of timber hauling is 40–50 km (compared to 200 km in the northern Kolsky
leskhoz). The climatic conditions are more favorable in this part of the region and the
demand for timber is higher due to the close location to the Finnish market. If we bear
in mind that most of the forest fund, defined as cutting areas, is in short-term use, there
is a very large timber reserve that remains unused.
Since the FFS’s capability to extract rents depends upon the number of potential bidders
— and that number is very low — it is difficult for the FFS to obtain a good price for
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 According to Regulations ... No. 345 (1998) forestland can be leased for different purposes: timber
harvesting; extraction of resin; collection and use of stumps, bark, birch-bark, fir-, spruce-, and pine
branches, Christmas trees, etc; secondary forest use (haymaking, cattle pasturing, berries, fruits, nuts,
mushrooms, medicinal plants, etc); hunting; cultural- and health purposes, tourism, and sport.
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timber resources. When winning an auction entails the construction of permanent roads
and infrastructure facilities — and enterprises have low purchasing power — it is the
distance of hauling that decides who will actually bid for the timber plot and who will
receive the leasing rights.
According to Russian legislation, both auctions and tenders require more than one
bidder. But if the authorities would strictly follow this requirement, no forest resources
would be utilized, since there are so few potential bidders in Murmansk. This would
mean a loss of income for the FFS. Therefore, the authorities tend to disregard this fact
and accept the bid when there is only one bidder, although this is contrary to the law.
But, as one insider comments, “life brings about its own corrections”. The typical
procedure seems to be the following: a single bidder proposes his bid, which is (close
to) the reservation price. The leskhoz selects an appropriate area for leasing and
utilization and the formal documents are prepared. Only then is the auction or tender
announced in the newspapers. If more bidders should suddenly appear — fine — this
would increase the price. If not, the first single bid proposed would be realized.
Before 1999, there were no timber tenders (konkursy) in Murmansk. In 1999, there have
been four timber tenders, all of which were closed tenders. Two of them were areas
intended for harvesting, one was for tourism, and the last one never actually occurred,
because the potential buyer was bankrupt. The common denominator is that there was
only one bidder.
The first closed timber tender (April 1999) included an area of 38 thousand ha in the
Kola and Pechenga districts (municipalities) with a yearly withdrawal of timber
amounting to 7,000 m3.15 This tender was only directed at local Russian forest
enterprises working in Murmansk. During the tender the price increased considerably
compared to the initial price. However, this price increase was not the result of
competition but the result of a decision taken by the Russian Government to raise the
minimum price (minimal’naia stavka) by 40 percent (cf. section 4.2). This led to an
increase in actual price (konkretnaia stavka) and, hence, the stumpage prices. Since the
payment for leasing is supposed to be higher than the stumpage price (popennaia plata),
the local forest management units (leskhozy) raised the reservation price. This meant a
total price increase of 60 percent. The leasing right was offered to the joint-stock
company “Guchur”, which was then given the rights to harvest but also the duties to
arrange for fire fighting, forest protection, and afforestation.
4.5 Collusion — when Auctions Break Down
As noted in section 2.3, collusion activities are less viable in sealed bid- than in oral
auctions. One indication that collusion actually takes place is that winning bids indeed
tend to be higher under sealed bidding than under oral bidding. When only a few
bidders participate in an auction, there is still a significant potential for collusion among
the bidders. In a one shot “game” the potential buyers would not so easily collude, but
in repeated “games” they have a certain interest in sticking to their deal.
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 The second closed timber tender in Murmansk was announced to take place 27 April 1999. That auction
included an area of 50 thousand hectares in the Kovdor district. An enterprise with foreign capital was
one potential bidder (Russian news, 1999).
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Brannman (1996) argues that public policy should be concerned with obtaining the
highest possible value for public timber and ensuring that forests are efficiently
allocated to the firm having the highest valuation. He finds that sealed-bids widen the
potential ‘pool’ of bidders and sealed bid auctions result in higher timber prices.
Theoretically, potential bidders to an imperfectly competitive market limit the ability to
charge high prices. In practice, however, in sealed-bid auctions it is impossible for
bidders to identify other potential bidders (Brannman, 1996:730). In oral auctions, on
the other hand, the potential bidders are participating and therefore easy to register.
Formally, the Russian auction model is a combination of oral auctions and sealed-bid
auctions, or pure oral auctions. In Murmansk, there have only been sealed-bid auctions.
However, this does not protect the sales from collusive activities. The fact that there are
few potential buyers can make it easy for bidders to cooperate or develop some common
understanding about which area “belongs” to whom and who should keep out of an
auction.
Since there is often only one potential buyer who is located close to the timber resources
offered, the FFS faces a problem in defining a reservation price, which does not under-
value the timber resources. The stumpage price may easily become the final reservation
price. The potential buyer has no intention of giving a higher bid, knowing that there is
no real competition going on. However, in the case of only one single potential buyer,
one should probably evaluate the outcome on the basis of bargaining theory rather than
auction theory. Both parties possess some degree of market power that they will seek to
exploit. The bargaining strengths, in turn, depend upon the institutional setting, the
sequence of moves, and on the parties’ abilities to commit themselves (bargaining
game, cf. section 2.2).
Auctions without competition involve a clear risk of “nepotism” and even outright
corruption among the seller and the buyer. This may particularly be the case when
leasing is conducted at the level of local forest management units (the leskhoz-level).
Legislative “loopholes” and contradicting laws also complicate the implementation of
new institutional mechanisms (Nilsson and Shvidenko, 1998). When timber auctions
were introduced in 1997, they were carried out locally, but in 1998 auctions were
organized regionally by the FFS in Murmansk. The Governor issued a decree
prohibiting local authorities from taking part in auctions. Regional authorities were
assumed to be more independent and less subjected to manipulation by external and
local actors. However, the process of leasing became more time consuming, inefficient
and impractical. There were few potential bidders and no real competition. A lot of
paper work was related to the implementation of auctions — even to small forest plots
with the size of 30–50 m3.
From 1 January 1999, auctions were again carried out locally in Murmansk. Other steps
have been taken to ensure impartiality. In Murmansk, auction commissions are
approved by the municipal administration. The deputy mayor in the municipality holds
the chairman position. Other members are representatives of the municipal financial
department and the local forest management unit (the leskhoz). According to the Forest
Code (1997:art. 35), auction commissions are to be chaired by the regional (political)
authority and include representatives of the regional Forest Management, environmental
protection agencies, as well as other interested organizations. The regional (political)
authority ensures impartial treatment of the bidders. However, leasing should be
prepared by the regional Forest Management with the participation of municipal
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government agencies and forest users (ibid.:art. 34). Also, according to Regulations ...
No. 99 (1997), the organizer must be the regional Forest Management and local forest
management units (the leskhozy).
4.6 Sustainability?
Sustainable utilization and management can be handled through rules and/or incentives.
In the Murmansk forest sector one relies primarily on rules. These rules are embedded
in binding contracts that are part of the leasing procedure. Forest users are obliged to
use forest plots according to the Forest Code (1997, art. 83). Forest users should not
harm the natural environment; they should carry out operations to prevent soil erosion,
conduct fire prevention activities, and minimize the negative effects of forest use. Forest
users are obliged to remove timber cut from the areas within a limited time frame. They
must carry out afforestation according to conditions set by the lease contract. The
leaseholder is obliged to fell and remove timber within the time stated in the forest
harvesting ticket and to clean the area and restore the forests.
Enforcement of rules requires monitoring, which is costly especially to an organization
such as the FFS with scarce economic and human resources. Rules can often be evaded
through loopholes. There is an urgent need for the FFS to establish efficient forest
monitoring and inventories in order to achieve sustainable development, but this
requires resources.16 For the time being the FFS is primarily collecting data (Nilsson and
Shvidenko, 1998). Incentives, on the other hand, are based on the firms’ pursuit of their
own self-interest. One way to provide the logging enterprises and sawmills with
incentives to run forests in a sustainable way is to give them long-term contracts.
However, both forest users and the FFS hesitate to enter into such contracts. The
reasons are manifold.
First, it is connected with the obligation put on the leaseholder to harvest a certain
amount of timber each year. If this level of harvesting is not reached, the leaseholder
will nevertheless have to pay taxes on the decided amount. Second, the forest
management plans that are required by a long-term contract discourages potential
Russian harvesting enterprises from establishing activities in the forests. Preparing such
plans costs too much.17 Third, future revenues and losses are difficult or even impossible
to calculate and the risk is high under the present unstable and stochastic economic and
political conditions in Russia. Finally, the FFS is reluctant to lease the forests on a long-
term basis because there is a high risk of the leaseholder becoming bankrupt. Under
such circumstances, it is difficult to renegotiate a contract. And, if the leaseholder fails
to appear, the last option is to bring the case to court. Hence, the typical contract is short
term, usually less than five years. To date, only the private enterprise Makarova has
concluded a 10-year contract in Murmansk. The well-known joint-stock company
“PRIRODA” concluded a 5-year contract.18
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 Monitoring is a system of observation, assessment and development of forecasts by the Forest Fund to
inform management of the use, conservation, protection and reproduction of forests.
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 Confirmed by Nadezhda Zemena, consultant of the Ministry of Industrial Development in the regional
administration (interview, September 1998).
18
 According to Pavel Pestov, the FFS in Murmansk region, November 1999.
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5. Conclusions
Auction theory states that the system of auctions used has minimal effect on the winning
price in an auction. On average, the different auction systems yield the same revenue to
the seller. An equilibrium exists in each auction system: given that each bidder follows
his own strategy with regard to his bid, no individual bidder could do better by bidding
differently. The following is of relevance for the timber price: the reservation price, the
distribution of valuations, and the number of bidders. The interaction between these
factors affects the existence of collusion. Collusion can appear in a situation where two
or more bidders make explicit or implicit agreements attempting to reduce the timber
price. Auction theory asserts that collusion is more likely in oral auctions than in sealed-
bid auctions. Collusion is also more easily sustained in second price than in first price
sealed-bid auctions. Since first price sealed-bid auctions are very common in
Murmansk, the FFS has formal means to control collusion. However, in Murmansk
there is rarely more than one bidder.
The frequent occurrence of “one bidder-auctions” may indicate that other actors stay
away and do not participate in auctions of areas that they understand already “belong”
to a particular bidder. If many potential bidders do this favor they achieve the desired
result of reducing the FFS’s price of timber. However, in the case of timber sales in
Murmansk we may witness a true disinterest in the timber resources reflected in the low
reservation price. The system does not invite much collusion among potential bidders as
it opens up informal “deals” between the FFS and the one “bidder”. For the time being,
this may be an inevitable step to maintain a minimum level of forestry activities —
keeping life in some local forest communities.
The auction system is built on a number of preconditions that are not available in
today’s Murmansk, probably reflecting the situation in Russia at large. In spite of this,
formal rules and procedures nevertheless influence local activities. Though having
problems with comprehending and perceiving the content and complexity of laws and
rules, local actors obviously attempt to follow them in Murmansk. This brings some
transparency into the system.
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